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Abstract: 
 
Articles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly 
concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities 
outside the United States has been limited. This paper tries to compare two cases that 
are dissimilar to the United States, namely Turkey and Israel and this essay asks the 
question: to what extent do the Kurdish and Arabic minorities influence Turkish and 
Israeli foreign policy? There is a particular emphasis on foreign policy influence of 
Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Arabic political parties. The party websites of the Pro-Arabic, 
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) and Meretz are looked into. With 
regard to Turkey, the party website of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) is examined. The BDP has been established in 2008, which is considerably 
later compared to the pro-Arabic political parties in Israel. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to investigate pro-Kurdish parties from before 2008, as these parties were 
banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. 
 It is argued in this paper that no proof can be found of pro-Arabic and pro-
Kurdish political parties influencing foreign policy. Since Israel and Turkey are truly 
dissimilar to the United States, other cases need to be examined in order to find out 
whether minorities in other countries influence foreign policy. Moreover, international 
organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, can play a role 
in accommodating minorities. More research is necessary to find out whether 
international organizations, as the Council of Europe and the EU, play a role in 
protecting minority rights.   
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List of Abbreviations: 
 
AKP   Justice and Development Party (conservative Turkish party from 2002 
                        – now). 
Balad National Democracy Assembly (Israeli Arab political party from 1995 
– now). 
BDP  Peace and Democracy Party (current pro-Kurdish Party, successor of 
DTP, from 2008 – now). 
DEHAP Democratic People’s Party (former pro-Kurdish party, from 1997 – 
2005). 
DTP  Democratic Society Party (successor of DEHAP, from 2005 – 2009). 
EU   European Union. 
Hadash  The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (since 1974, a socialist 
party in Israel: Specifically concerned with the Israeli Arab minority).  
HADEP People’s Democracy Party (former pro-Kurdish party, from 1994 – 
2003). 
Hamas  Islamic Resistance Movement (Palestinian Islamist organization). 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency. 
KRG  Kurdish Regional Government (in Northern Iraq). 
MHP   National Movement Party (nationalistic political party in Turkey). 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish organization since 1974, since 
1984 in an armed struggle with the Turkish state). 
US  United States.  
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Introduction: 
 
The influence of minorities on domestic politics has been studied at large. Yet when it 
comes to the influence of minorities on foreign policy-making, few authors can make 
a convincing claim that minorities can influence foreign decision-making. Ögelman, 
Money and Martin (2002) make a strong claim when they argue that the right-wing 
Cuban community was able to influence American foreign policy towards Cuba, even 
after the Cold War had ended (p. 160 & p. 161). Even when security concerns were no 
longer eminent, the Cuban minority in the United States pressured the Clinton 
government in tightening the embargo against Cuba (p. 161). Hence, Ögelman, 
Money and Martin (2002) claim that “pressure of the right-wing exile community” 
was the only clear explanation why the U.S. decided to isolate Cuba even further (p. 
161). 
With regard to the influence of minorities on foreign policy decision-making 
outside the United States, not many studies have assessed this influence empirically. 
Moore (2002) and Saideman (2002) are, just like Ögelman, Money and Martin (2002), 
authors who believe that minorities can have a larger impact on foreign policy-making 
than one would normally expect given the small size of minorities (Saideman, 2002, 
p. 93). Moore (2002) argues that ethnic minorities can even influence foreign policy 
when the ethnic majority opposes the minority (p. 77). Both authors then come up 
with the hypothesis that minorities can indeed influence foreign policy-making. 
However, Moore (2002) and Saideman (2002) do not empirically test this hypothesis 
in detail. 
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This paper then tries to investigate the influence of two minorities on foreign policy-
making, namely the Kurds in Turkey and the Arabs in Israel. It is argued that these 
two countries are dissimilar to the United States but are quite similar to each other. 
The aim of this essay is to see whether proof can be found of Kurdish and Arab 
influence on foreign policy-making as could be seen in the U.S. The question of this 
paper then is: to what extent do the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the Arab minority 
in Israel influence foreign policy decision-making in these countries? 
This essay shall especially investigate the aims of Kurdish and Arabic political 
parties in Turkish and Israeli foreign policy-making. But first of all previous 
publications concerning minorities shall be looked at, after which it is argued that the 
selected cases in this paper are dissimilar to the United States and are thus worthwhile 
investigating. It is then argued that multiple similarities exist between Israel and 
Turkey and that these similarities are the reason for choosing these cases. In the 
following sections, which look at domestic and foreign differences between the two 
countries, some differences can be found such as a difference in electoral system but 
also a difference in membership of international organizations. Some of these 
differences are then investigated in greater detail and a special focus will be on pro-
Kurdish and pro-Arabic political parties and whether there are signs that these parties 
influence Turkish and Israeli foreign policy. 
It shall be argued that little proof was found of these parties influencing 
Turkish and Israeli foreign policy. Yet more empirical research is needed to find out 
whether other factors, such as EU pressure and diaspora influence, play a role in 
strengthening the Kurdish and Arabic minority. Turkey is an official candidate for 
accession to the European Union and one of the key criteria for accession is minority 
accommodation. This could imply that the EU can pressure Turkey in accommodating 
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the Kurdish minority so that the Kurds can play a larger role in Turkish society. As 
Israel is not applying for EU accession, the Arabs do not have this opportunity that the 
Kurds have. 
It is important to note that for this essay, the comparative method with a most-
similar systems design is used as a methodology. Moreover, with regard to Israel the 
focus is on Israel proper. This is the description for Israel, excluding the territories 
that it acquired after the 1967 Six-Day War. The Palestinian population living in the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights are thus not included in the 
analysis. The United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council have often 
been critical of Israeli settlements in these territories, starting already in the 1980s 
(Roberts, 1990, p. 85 & p. 86). 
 
Previous Publications: 
 
The influence of minorities on foreign policy-making is an aspect of political science 
that has hardly been empirically assessed. Already in 1992 Alexander DeConde 
proclaimed that the influence of ethnic minorities on American foreign policy is 
understudied (DeConde, 1992, ix). Where DeConde (1992) argues that Anglo-
Americans retain dominance in American foreign policy over other groups (p. 199), 
Saideman (2002) believes that minorities in general, so not only in the United States, 
can have a larger influence on foreign policy than one would otherwise expect, given 
their size (p. 93). Ögelman, Money and Martin (2002) empirically assess the influence 
of Cuban immigrants in the United States and they also come to a similar conclusion 
that small minorities can have a major influence on foreign policy-making.  
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When minority influence on foreign policy has been investigated, it was primarily on 
the influence of minorities in the United States. Saideman (2002) argues that the 
Greek and Armenian minority in the US are able to influence US foreign policy on 
issues that these minorities find important. Ögelman, Money and Martin (2002) argue 
that Cuban immigrants played a key role in American foreign policy towards Cuba, 
even after the end of the Cold War. Last but not least, Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) 
state in their book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy that the Israeli lobby in 
the United States, consisting of a loose group of organizations played a large role in 
American foreign policy towards Israel specifically and the Middle East in general (p. 
viii). The authors argue that individuals in the lobby not only played a role in 
American foreign policy, but even shaped foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and Israel’s confrontations with Iran. Moreover, these policies were not in 
accordance with the American national interests and would, on the long run, also 
harm Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. xiii). 
 Hence, lobby groups have the power to shape foreign policy-making, even 
when it is not in the interest of the state. These examples all come from the United 
States. Ögelman, Money and Martin (2002) have argued that access to political power 
in the United States is quite large (p. 163). Moreover, when minorities have 
substantial financial resources, such as the Cubans when they migrated to the United 
States, it is even easier to have political power (ibid, p. 158). 
 Just like Ögelman, Money and Martin (2002), Saideman (2002) makes a 
similar claim when it comes to the influence of ethnic minorities on foreign policy. He 
argues that they often have more influence than expected at first-sight (p. 93). 
Saideman (2002), however, does not empirically test his argument, instead he raises 
the more general question: “do ethnic minorities influence foreign policy, and if so, 
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how?” (2002, p. 96). Then he comes up with several reasons why minorities might 
have more influence than one would normally expect (Saideman, 2002, p. 93). 
First of all, given that minorities are small, it could be easier for them to 
mobilize than for larger groups (p. 93). Moreover, Saideman (2002) argues that 
“smaller groups will tend to have a narrower focus” compared to larger groups (p. 
98). Hence, minorities tend to concentrate on only a couple of issues that are of 
importance to them. Most importantly, according to Saideman (2002), minorities are 
concerned with the well-being of their own ethnic group in other countries (p. 95). 
Finally, when minorities are only interested in a couple of issues, they might receive 
the support of the majority if these issues are somewhat irrelevant for the majority (p. 
99). Saideman (2002) continuously provides examples of the United States, in which 
several diaspora, such as the Greek and Armenian, have had more influence than at 
first expected. 
The author argues that the Greek minority in the US was able to organize itself 
and hence could pressure the American government in keeping the contact limited 
with Macedonia when Former Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1990s. Due to Greek 
pressure in the United States, the newly developed state Macedonia had major 
economic difficulties when it was established (Saideman, 2002, p. 98-99). Thus, as 
the majority of the Americans were not concerned about Macedonia, the small but 
powerful Greek minority in the US was able to influence US foreign policy and push 
Washington in taking measures that were favorable to the Greek minority. 
Another example that Saideman (2002) provides is the Armenian minority that 
was effective in limiting US contact with Azerbaijan after the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
War over Nagorno-Karabakh was fought during the first half of the 1990s. Once again 
the American majority was not greatly interested in the conflict, as was the case with 
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Macedonia. The small Armenian minority was then able to shape US foreign policy, 
as it was a coherent group, well organized and as the majority of Americans was 
disinterested in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Saideman, 2002, p. 99-100). 
 Problems with the literature noted above is that Saideman (2002) makes 
assumptions that have not yet been assessed empirically. Ögelman et al. (2002) and 
Mearsheimer & Walt (2010) do examine the influence of minorities empirically. Yet 
their main focus is on minority groups living in the United States. The same can be 
said about deConde (1992) who was also only interested in minority influence in the 
United States. 
This thesis then tries to examine the influence of ethnic minorities outside the 
United States and takes cases that are dissimilar to the United States. This essay 
concentrates on the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the Arab minority in Israel. But 
before investigating the influence of both minorities on Israeli and Turkish foreign 
policy, it is explained why these cases were selected. 
 
Dissimilarity to the United States: 
 
The cases analyzed in this thesis are rather different compared to the minorities that 
have influence in the United States. First of all, the Kurds in Turkey and the Arabs in 
Israel have a lower income compared to the national average (Sarigil, 2010 and 
Haberfeld & Cohen, 2007). Hence they do not have the same extent of financial 
resources that the Cubans or the Israelis have in the United States. Moreover, Israel 
and Turkey are unitary states, whereas the U.S. is a federal state. An additional reason 
why the Cubans play an important political role, according to Ögelman et al. (2002), 
is that the Cubans mainly live in swing-state Florida. Florida is often critical in the 
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outcome of presidential elections, the extremely close 2000 Presidential Election 
between George W. Bush and Al Gore often comes to mind. As a result, Cuban-
American voters have become a true electoral power in the United States (p. 159). 
Since Turkey and Israel are unitary states, it is on forehand highly unlikely that the 
Arabs and Kurds have the same degree of electoral influence as the Cubans. 
A third difference between Israel and Turkey on the one hand and the U.S on 
the other hand, is that conflicts have occurred in the former but not in the latter. In his 
2005 book Multiculturalism in Asia, Will Kymlicka stresses the importance of 
minority protection. Once minority rights are accommodated by the state, minority 
issues are de-securitized. However, if these issues are not settled, states may feel 
insecure in geopolitical terms as their national minorities might feel a stronger bond 
with a neighboring enemy. The hosting state then fears that the national minority 
would collaborate with this neighbor (Kymlicka, 2005). One of the examples that 
Kymlicka provides is Italy prior to the Second World War. Italy namely feared that 
the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol would be more loyal to Austria or 
Germany than to the Italian state (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 34). Since Western European 
states no longer have neighboring enemies, minority rights are accommodated and 
hence de-securitized. 
 It is difficult to argue that the de-securitization hypothesis applies to Israel. 
Since not all neighboring countries have recognized Israel and consist of an Arab 
population, the Israeli state might still fear that the Arab minority is disloyal to Israel. 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman has even publicly questioned 
the Arab loyalty to the Israeli state. After the 2009 parliamentary elections the leader 
of Yisrael Beiteinu, gained 15 seats in the Knesset with the slogan “no loyalty, no 
 11 
citizenship” (Lavi, 2010). Hence, it seems that minority issues in Israel are not de-
securitized to the extent that they are in Western Europe or the United States. 
The case of the Kurdish minority in Turkey is slightly different compared to 
Israel. Since Kymlicka (2005) concentrates on national minorities with a close 
relationship to a neighboring state, this does not apply to the Kurdish minority, as no 
Kurdish state exists so far. Yet Turkey is less accommodative towards its Kurdish 
minority compared to Israel towards the Arabs. Cohen (1999) argues that the Turkish 
state tries to assimilate the Kurdish minority and has displaced between half a million 
to two million Kurds in the struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
Security concerns are also present in Turkey. Turkey has fought the PKK 
domestically, which has led to approximately 30.000 deaths in the 1980s and 1990s 
alone (Cornell, 2001). Moreover, in 2012 alone, more than 700 deaths had to be 
counted in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Tocci, 2013, p. 5). To sum up, it seems that 
for both Turkey and Israel minority issues are not yet de-securitized to the extent that 
these issues are de-securitized in the United States. 
Israel has fought several conflicts in its history along her borders. In the 21
st
 
Century, a conflict broke out with the Shiite Organization Hezbollah in 2006 in 
Southern Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). During this war approximately 4.000 
rockets were launched towards Northern Israel from Lebanon and more than 300.000 
Israelis had to be evacuated (Palmieri et al., 2008, p. 1208).  Moreover, Israel fought 
twice a conflict in the Gaza Strip, primarily against the Islamic Resistance Movement
1
 
(Hamas). During these wars, large proportions of Israeli territory were attacked by 
Hezbollah and Hamas, especially through rocket shootings. Hence, a considerable 
proportion of the Israeli and Turkish population has been in a conflict situation 
                                                 
1
 Official name of the organization 
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(Cornell, 2001 & Rodman, 2013). The United States has also been in conflict 
situations, but these were located abroad, mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, 
the U.S. population in general, is not as familiar with conflict situations compared to 
the Turks and Israelis. 
The fourth and final difference between the United States on the one hand and 
Turkey and Israel, on the other, is the type of diversity. When investigating minority 
influence in the United States, one is usually-speaking examining the influence of 
immigrants or as Will Kymlicka calls them, ethnic groups. Kymlicka (1995) argues 
that these groups want to integrate into society (p. 10 & p. 11). The Kurds in Turkey 
and the Arabs in Israel are of course not immigrants, but a national minority. National 
minorities are incorporated by the larger state and usually they wish to be seen as a 
distinct group next to the majority group (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 10). Often, national 
minorities demand a certain form of autonomy or self-government (p. 10). Hence, 
when it comes to demands, Kymlicka would argue that the Kurds and Arabs would 
have different demands compared to immigrant groups in the United States.  
 Turkey and Israel are thus both quite dissimilar to the United States. Since 
previous authors have shown that minorities have influenced American foreign policy, 
it is essential to find out to what extent minorities in Israel and Turkey can also 
influence foreign policy-making. Israel and Turkey namely have similar 
characteristics, which shall be explained below. But first the methodology for this 
essay is explained. 
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Methodology: 
 
George and Bennett (2004) state that it can be useful to select cases that are similar to 
each other but are dissimilar to a third case (p. 83). This essay then compares two 
cases, Israel and Turkey, which are rather similar but which are dissimilar compared 
to the case that is studied the most, the United States. The comparative method is thus 
used, with a most-similar research design. The comparative method is defined as a 
“systematic analysis of small number of cases” (Collier, 1991, p. 9) and the method 
can be seen as “the first stage of research, in which hypotheses are carefully 
formulated” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). A statistical analysis should then test the 
hypotheses with a sample size, which should be as large as possible (Lijphart, 1971, p. 
685). The comparative method has a better reputation in assessing hypotheses 
compared to the case study method, as one can systemically compare the chosen cases 
and assess the value of alternative explanations (Collier, 1991, p. 10). When taking 
into consideration scarcity of time and resources when doing research, the 
comparative method can be more useful than the statistical method, as one can 
investigate cases in greater depth (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685; Collier, 1991, p. 9). 
Lijphart (1974) and Collier (1991) state that the comparative method is 
particularly useful in these cases where more empirical research is needed. Given that 
the influence of minorities on foreign-policy has hardly been tested empirically 
before, research in this field has only recently commenced and hence the comparative 
method is suitable. The main concern of the comparative method is the so-called 
‘many variables, few cases’ problem (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). As only a couple of 
cases are compared, the ‘small number of cases’ problem is typical for the 
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comparative method, whereas the ‘many variables problem’ occurs often in different 
types of research (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). 
Collier (1991) argues that one of the solutions to minimize the ‘many 
variables, few cases’ problem, is to concentrate on cases that are comparable to one 
another (p. 16). Such a most-similar systems design investigates cases that are truly 
similar, but where the dependent variable differs. The main advantage of this design is 
that it keeps irrelevant independent variables constant (Anckar, 2008, p. 389; Sartori, 
1991, p. 250).  Sartori (1991) claims that most comparativists use the most similar 
research design. Przeworski and Teune (1970) have advocated for the opposite design 
(p. 31). These authors criticize the most-similar research design as it often has 
problems with evaluating alternative hypotheses. Moreover, both authors claim that 
even though only a few differences exist amongst the selected cases in the most-
similar research design, these differences are still likely to over-determine the results 
(Przeworski & Teune, p. 34). 
This main problem for the most-similar research design is not truly serious for 
this essay, as alternative hypotheses are hardly available. Moreover, as most 
comparativists use this design, it shall also be used for this thesis. In the following 
chapter some background information is given. In the chapter thereafter, multiple 
similarities between Israel and Turkey are highlighted in the case selection chapter. 
These similarities are the reason why both countries are studied in-depth for this 
paper. 
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Background: 
 
The Kurds primarily live geographically concentrated in five different countries: 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Approximately half of the Kurds reside in 
Turkey and since the creation of the Turkish state they defy assimilation (Heraclides, 
1991, p. 131). Heraclides argues (1991) that even though a majority of the Kurds live 
compactly together in the mountainous region of Eastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and 
Northwestern Iran, many differences exist among the Kurds and no single language 
has come to the fore (p. 129-131). 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First 
World War, the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 promised the Kurds autonomy and the 
prospective of an independent state in the future (Heraclides, 1991, p. 131). However, 
when the Turkish War of Independence came to an end in the beginning of the 1920s 
and Kemal Atatürk became the first President of the Republic of Turkey, the Treaty of 
Sèvres was not implemented. Instead, in the new treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923, not a single minority was mentioned and as a result no provisions of self-rule 
were provided to the Kurds (Heraclides, 1991, p. 131). At first, during the beginning 
of the 1920s, the Kurds still received some relative freedom but already a bit later 
they were designated “’Mountain Turks’ who had ‘forgotten their mother tongue’” 
(Heraclides, 1991, p. 132). The identification of ‘Mountain Turks’ was the official 
Turkish designation for Kurds until 1991 and hence the Kurds were denied any own 
identity.  
 Heraclides (1991) argues that since there are many differences amongst the 
Kurds, the group does not have the aim of a pan-Kurdish state (p. 132). The Turkish 
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and Iraqi government, however, have used the fear of a pan-Kurdistan in order to 
assimilate the Kurdish minority. Criss and Çetiner (2000) have a different opinion and 
argue that the PKK has pan-Kurdish claims. Hence, their opinions are diverging on 
the possibility of pan-Kurdism, but similar to Heraclides (1991) Criss and Çetiner 
(2000) believe that Turkey has been oversensitive to minority issues since the Treaty 
of Sèvres in 1920. 
 During the 1930s the Turkish government believed that by mixing the Kurdish 
minority with the Turkish population, it could assimilate the Kurds (Çağaptay, 2002, 
p. 73). Çağaptay (2002) argues that the Kurds belonged to the least respected group 
during the 1930s and were forbidden to receive naturalization papers during these 
years (p. 75). Even though the Kurdish minority severely opposed assimilation, after 
the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in 1938, the Kurds in Turkey remained 
relatively peaceful for a couple of decennia. Most rebellions took place in either Iran 
or Iraq. Heraclides (1991) argues that especially during the 1960s the Iraqi Kurds 
were supported the most by the Syrian government and then especially materially (p. 
144). When the largest Kurdish organization in Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), was established in the mid-1970s and decided to create an armed faction 
within the political organization in 1984, the headquarters of the organization were 
located in the Syrian capital Damascus (Cornell, 2001). From 1984 until the end of 
the 20
th
 Century more than 30.000 people have lost their lives due to attacks from the 
armed faction of the PKK. Even though other Kurdish organizations exist in Turkey, 
the PKK is the most important one (Cornell, 2001).  
In contrast to the Kurds in Turkey, the Arabs in Israel have not been as violent. 
Israel has fought several conflicts with its Arab neighbors in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 
1973 and intense animosity between Israel and the Palestinians has occurred during 
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the First Intifada starting in 1987 and the Second Intifada starting in 2000, but internal 
violence between Israeli Arabs and the Israeli state has been limited. Frisch (2011) 
argues that even though there is resentment amongst the Arab minority, most Arabs 
express this resentment by participating in elections and by empowering local NGOs 
(p. 162). Hence, they participate in Israeli society through the official system. 
A resemblance between the Arabs in Israel and the Kurds in Turkey is that 
both minorities primarily live along the borders with other states. As mentioned, the 
Israeli Arabs, mainly live along the Syrian and Lebanese border, the Kurds largely 
live in Eastern Turkey along the borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria. A significant 
difference between the two minorities for the different countries, however, is that 
Israel has multiple Arab states surrounding it and some states such as, Syria, Lebanon 
and Saudi-Arabia, have not recognized Israel. On the other hand, there is no Kurdish 
country bordering Turkey. The Kurds have received a significant degree of autonomy 
within Northern Iraq but no such Kurdish state exists. Moreover, all border-states 
have recognized Turkey. Hence, it would seem that Turkey’s borders are better 
secured than Israel’s but still many PKK attacks have been orchestrated from 
Northern Iraq (Cornell, 2001). 
Even when all surrounding states have recognized Turkey, this does not imply 
that the Turkish state has had amicable relations with its neighbors in the past. The 
PKK has often been the cause of friction between Turkey and the neighboring states. 
Another example, next to the case of Iraq described above, is Syria under Hafez al-
Assad, the former President of the country. Under his rule, the PKK and their leader 
Abdullah Öcalan had a safe basis in Syria from the beginning of the 1980s to 1998. 
Damascus has even been the headquarters of the Kurdish organization. When the 
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PKK commenced armed attacks in 1984 against Turkish targets, Syrian-Turkish 
relations were significantly affected (Cornell, 2001). 
With regard to Turkish foreign policy, Murinson (2006) argues that since the 
end of the Cold War Turkey’s foreign policy has become an extension of domestic 
politics (p. 945). Considering that Turkey has continuously tried to assimilate the 
Kurdish population since the 1930’s, it should come as no surprise that during the 
winter of 2003, when the U.S. attack on Iraq became eminent, Ankara tried its utmost 
to prevent a Kurdish state from arising in Northern Iraq. Such a potential Kurdish 
state could then also stimulate separatism among the Turkish Kurds (Murinson, 2006, 
p. 954). Sözen (2010), however, argues that there is a wing amongst the Turkish elite 
that favors normalization with and a rapprochement to the Kurds (p. 108). 
Considering that there is a different camp within the Turkish elite that strictly opposes 
such a rapprochement, significant tension occurs within the Turkish elite (Sözen, 
2010, p. 108). 
Where Smooha (2002) believes that Turkey “does not meet the minimal 
requirements of democracy” (p. 42), as it is maltreating the Kurdish minority, Sözen 
(2010) argues that this treatment vis-à-vis the Kurds is more nuanced now. On the one 
hand, the Turkish government continues its armed struggle against the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), on the other hand more individual freedoms are provided for 
the Kurds since 9/11 (Sözen, 2010, p. 115). Hence, important changes are occurring at 
the moment in Turkey both in domestic policy as well as foreign affairs. 
According to Smooha (2002), Israel does not pursue an assimilationist policy 
towards its Arab minority (p. 426) and so far Israel has proven to be stable (p. 429). 
Yet, since Israel is considered to be a Jewish and democratic state Palestinian refugees 
are not allowed to repatriate to Israel (p. 429). Smooha (2002) argues that Turkey 
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during the largest part of the 20
th
 Century has tried to assimilate the Kurds. As Moore 
(2002) has argued that minorities can influence foreign policy even when they are 
oppressed (p. 77), it is essential to investigate whether Moore’s hypothesis holds with 
regard to the Kurdish population in Turkey. The case of Israel, however, is also a 
special one, since Israel is a Jewish state and according to Smooha (1990), the welfare 
of all Jews worldwide is an important part of Israeli foreign policy. Thus, when it 
comes to the Arab minority one can question whether they have any influence in 
Israel’s foreign policy. 
An additional problem for the Arabs in Israel is that it is highly unlikely that 
the Jewish majority will comply with the demands of the Arab minority. Saideman 
(2002) argued that minorities can play a larger role than expected in foreign policy, as 
the demands of the minority might be irrelevant for the majority and in such a 
scenario the minority can have a larger influence than expected in foreign policy-
making. This scenario of minority influence is unlikely in Israel. One of the key 
minority demands namely is the right of previous Arab residents to return to Israel. 
This demand for repatriation, however, is highly problematic for the Israeli state 
because if this demand would be fulfilled, Arabs would outnumber the Jewish 
population. Hence, any Israeli government so far has opposed the request of the Arabs 
and on the contrary demands an end on all such claims (Quigley, 2008, p. 273 – 274).  
One problem for the Kurdish minority would be that according to Saideman, 
there still is a large chance that minorities cannot influence foreign policy when they 
are repressed or when other limitations exist (2002, p. 97). Given that the Turkish 
government throughout its history has often repressed the Kurds, by trying to 
assimilate them, one would then expect that the Kurds do not influence Turkish 
foreign policy. Saideman (2002) then continues by arguing that ethnic groups, who 
 20 
are a minority in every state, hardly have any foreign policy influence in any state (p. 
97). He provides the example of the Roma, but the same can as well be said about the 
Kurds. 
Before finding out whether there are any signs of Kurdish and Arab influence 
in foreign policy decision-making, the similarities between Turkey and Israel are 
mentioned and explained, as these similarities are the reason why both cases were 
selected in the first place 
 
Case Selection: 
 
Similarities between the Cases: 
As was argued before, Turkey and Israel are dissimilar compared to the United States.  
The state systems in Israel and Turkey are unitary and not federal as in the U.S.  
Moreover, the population in both states has had conflict experiences whereas this is 
less the case in the United States. In addition, the examined minorities in the U.S. 
often have a middle-income, whereas the minorities in the selected cases are rather 
disenfranchised. Finally, the Kurds and the Arabs can be considered national 
minorities, whereas immigrant influence has often been examined in the U.S. Since 
Israel and Turkey are quite dissimilar to the U.S. the claims made concerning minority 
influence in the United States may be rather different in the Turkish and Israeli cases. 
  For a most-similar research design, cases are selected that are “as similar as 
possible” (Anckar, 2008, p. 389). In this chapter, it is argued that numerous 
similarities exist between Turkey and Israel and that these similarities are the reason 
why both countries are examined in this paper. Several indicators are used for the 
 21 
comparison: population percentage and demographic development, religion, 
geographic location and concentration, income discrepancy, and political similarities. 
First of all, the Kurds in Turkey and the Arabs in Israel both consist of a little 
more than 20% of the total population. The Israeli Bureau of Statistics estimated in 
April 2013 that the Israeli Arab population comprised of 20.7% of the country’s total 
population and that the population is likely to continue to grow further since the Arab 
population has a growth rate of 2.4% compared to 1.8% for the Jewish population 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013).   
The exact proportion of the Kurdish population is unknown. The Turkish 
government estimates that 15.7% of the entire population is Kurdish. Kurdish 
organizations place this percentage at more than 25%. Cohen’s (1999) estimate of the 
Kurdish population lies closer to the Arab proportion in Israel. More recently, 
Loizides (2010) has stated that the Kurds consist of 23% of the Turkish population. 
Similar to the Arabs in Israel, this percentage is likely to grow further in the future as 
the reproductive rate amongst the Kurdish population is considerably higher than the 
Turkish average (Loizides, 2010, p. 514). An additional similarity between both 
minorities is that the vast majority adheres to Sunni Islam. Approximately 75% of the 
Kurds are Sunni (Loizides, 2010, p. 514). 83% of the Arab population in Israel is 
Muslim (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007), of which a large majority also adheres to 
Sunni Islam. 
One important side-note needs to be made concerning religion. The majority 
of Kurds adhere to the same religion as most Turks, namely to Sunni Islam. In Israel, 
the majority of the population is Jewish, which is of course not the case for the Israeli 
Arabs. Yet even though Israel embraces Judaism as its state religion, the Arab 
minority is not discouraged to practice their religion. 
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An additional similarity between the Kurdish and the Arab minority is that both 
minorities are concentrated in one region. Most Kurds live in the Eastern regions of 
Turkey. The proportion of Kurds is especially high in the Eastern regions of Central 
Eastern Anatolia (79.1%) and Southeastern Anatolia (64.1%). Next to the Kurds 
living in Eastern Turkey, a couple of million Turks have migrated over the last couple 
of decades to the Western Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir. Nevertheless the 
majority of Kurds still lives in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Approximately 10 
million Kurds live in these two regions compared to two million in Istanbul. 
 Comparable to the Kurds, a majority of the Arabs live in one region, namely 
the northern part of Israel. According to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, 60% of the 
approximately 1.65 million Arabs live in Northern Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2007). The Northern District is the sole district where the Arabs have a majority. Next 
to the North, a substantial proportion of the Arab population lives in Jerusalem. 
Approximately one-fifth of the total Arab population in Israel lives in Jerusalem 
(Jewish Virtual Library, 2013)
2
. It is hereby important to note that the population of 
East Jerusalem is also included. Thus, a majority of the Kurds and Arabs live in one 
region, yet it is important to remember that there is a minority that lives in the largest 
city of the country. Both minorities are mainly geographically concentrated in one 
area and are not dispersed throughout the entire country. 
An additional similarity between both minorities is that they are socially and 
economically disenfranchised compared to the national average. Southeast Turkey 
where most Kurds live is the least developed part of the country (Sarigil, 2010, p. 
538). Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci (1999) estimate that approximately 65% of all 
Turkish Kurds live in Southeast Turkey (p. 1002). In the late 1990s the Kurds were 
                                                 
2
 Information from the website is based on the Israeli Bureau of Statistics website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template_eng.html?hodaa=201311097.   
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also materially worse off compared to the national average (p. 1006). This is still the 
case now, but according to Yildirim and Öcal (2006) income disparities between the 
regions have been decreasing during the 1990s (p. 564), but a large discrepancy still 
exists between the richer Western regions and the poorer Eastern regions (p. 560). 
In Israel, the Arabs are the worst performing social group, in society. They 
have the lowest average income in Israel behind the two main Jewish groups: 
Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews. A minor difference with the Kurds and the Arabs is that 
in Israel inequalities have been growing (Haberfeld & Cohen, 2007 p. 668), whereas 
income disparities between the regions in Turkey have been decreasing (Yildirim & 
Öcal, 2006, p. 564). Haberfeld and Cohen (2007) investigate income disparities since 
the mid-1970s. They argue that since the 1990s income differences have grown 
amongst the several social groups in Israel, with the Arabs being even worse off 
compared to the national average than before (Haberfeld & Cohen, 2007 p. 664).  
Arabs had a 20% higher income in 2001 compared to 1992.  Mizrahi and Ashkenazi 
men respectively increased their income by 40% and 30% in 2002 (p. 664).  
There is thus a difference with regards to income disparities between Israel 
and Turkey. Where the discrepancy has been declining in Turkey (Yildirim and Öcal, 
2006, p. 564), income inequalities have increased in Israel (Haberfeld & Cohen, 2007 
p. 664). Yet, when looking at the current income inequalities through the Gini 
Coefficient, Israel and Turkey are very much alike. 
Moreover, with regard to life expectancy, Arab men had a four-year shorter 
life expectancy in 2012 than Jewish men and life expectancy for Arab women was 
three years lower than for their Jewish counterparts (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013). 
Furthermore, As’ad Ghanem (1998) argues that the Israeli state cannot be perceived 
as a democracy, but rather as an ethnic state, with Jews being preferred (p. 428). 
 24 
Moreover, the state discriminates against the Arab population and tries to exclude it in 
public life. Even though the Arabs have the chance to participate in society, they are 
not offered equality (idem, p. 428). The same can be said as well about the Kurds of 
course, as Turkey has for a long time tried to assimilate the Kurdish minority 
(Çağaptay, 2002) and simply called them ‘Mountain Turks’ (Heraclides, 1991). 
Hence, both the Arabs and the Kurds are disenfranchised and both minorities have 
suffered from state discrimination.  
From a political and state structure perspective, Israel and Turkey are also 
quite alike. Both countries are unitary states. Hence, the central government in Ankara 
and Jerusalem is supreme and has “indivisible sovereignty” over regional units 
(Roeder & Rothchild, 2005, p. 135). Federal countries can have an advantage over 
unitary states, as the federal system provides more opportunities for minorities to be 
represented in society (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005, p. 136). Federal systems are more 
favorable in accommodating minorities, as it is more difficult for the majority to 
dominate the minority. Moreover, federal states can empower minorities, as minorities 
can rule themselves and this tactic often reduces the temptation for minorities to 
defect from the state. These advantages are not present in unitary states and thus also 
not present in Israel and Turkey. 
 An additional similarity between Israel and Turkey is that they are the sole 
established democracies within the region. After 1997, when the Turkish military 
required the ousting of Prime-Minister Erbakan, the military no longer directly 
interfered in Turkish politics (Aydinli, 2009, p. 585). Israel has a longer democratic 
tradition. In order to compare both countries equally it is important to remember that 
this essay investigates the impact of minorities on foreign policy-making in the first 
21
st
 Century. 
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Turkey and Israel have also has had very amicable relations since the 1990s until 
recently (Oğuzlu, 2010, p. 273). Moreover, both states are located in a highly volatile 
region. The reason here is that one should not select cases simply because they are 
located in the same region but instead one should select cases based on their 
similarities (Collier, 1991, p. 17). The selected cases here, Israel and Turkey, have the 
double advantage that multiple similarities exist between the two and that they are 
located in the same region.  
There are several reasons for investigating the Kurdish and the Arab minority 
for this essay. First of all, both minorities comprise of approximately 20% of the total 
population in Turkey and Israel. In addition, a majority of the Arab and Kurdish 
minorities live concentrated in one area and are socially and economically 
disenfranchised compared to the national average. Given that Turkey and Israel are 
both democratic states with elections occurring at least once every four years, one 
would expect that both minorities would have an equal chance of influencing politics. 
Yet the electoral system between both countries is not entirely similar as shall be 
explained below. 
 
Foreign Differences between Israel and Turkey: 
When it comes to finding differences between Turkey and Israel a distinction is made 
between foreign differences and domestic differences. The main difference 
concerning the Arab and the Kurdish minority in Israel and Turkey is that no Kurdish 
state exists in the world whereas several Arab states do exist. Moore (2002) argues 
that the chance of conflict increases when an ethnic minority has a tie with the 
majority or an advantaged minority in a bordering state (p. 79). He thus claims that 
ethnic ties tend to lead to longer inter-state crises (p. 83). This seems to be the case for 
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Israel, since Syria has still not recognized Israel and the Palestinian Authority has 
only decided to recognize Israel in 1993 during the Oslo Accords. Moore (2002) even 
claims that the Palestinians and the Syrians made a claim on Israel’s territory (p. 81). 
Since Palestinian Arabs and Arabs have a vast majority within Syria and 
Palestine, one could expect that conflict has occurred between Israel on the one hand 
and Syria and the Palestinian Authority on the other, which has occurred on multiple 
occasions. Moreover, during and after the Second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 
2000, tensions between Israel and the Palestinians increased again (Brym & Araj, 
2006). When it comes to the Arab minority within Israel, however, the extent of 
conflict with the Israeli state is surely not as high as is the case with Syria and the 
Palestinians. Hence, it seems on first sight that even though there is a tie between the 
Arab Israeli minority, on the one hand, and Syria and the Palestinian Authority on the 
other, intra-state conflict in Israel is limited to non-existent. This can be considered 
problematic for Moore’s argument that conflict increases when minorities have a tie 
with majorities in neighboring states. 
One of the main international differences between Turkey and Israel however 
is that Israel has had multiple conflicts with its neighbors in the 21
st
 Century, Turkey 
though did not have so far in this century. The last time that Turkey was involved in 
an inter-state conflict was during the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus. Since then Turkey has 
had fought against the PKK and has also conducted several attacks against the PKK 
on Iraqi soil (Cornell, 2001). Nonetheless the Turkish state was not involved in the 
same level of inter-state conflict as Israel. 
 The non-recognition of Israel by neighboring Arab states, such as Lebanon, 
Syria and Saudi-Arabia is a problem for Israel that does not exist for Turkey as all 
regional states recognize the Turkish state. Syria is the sole state that is both a 
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neighbor of Israel and Turkey at the same time and both the Kurdish minority in 
Turkey and the Arab minority in Israel are located in relative proximity to the Syrian 
border. Since both minorities primarily live close to the Syrian border and have 
kinship ties with the two largest ethnic groups in Syria, they should primarily have an 
interest in the relations vis-à-vis Syria.  
 These kinship ties exist as the two largest ethnic groups in Syria are Arabs and 
Kurds. The Arabs comprise of the vast majority in Syria and the Kurds are the largest 
minority, with approximately 9% of the total Syrian population. When it comes to 
Israeli-Syrian and Turkish-Syrian relations, these relationships are often constrained. 
Israel, of course does not even have any official relations due to Syria’s non-
recognition of Israel.  
With regard to Turkish-Syrian relations official relations exist. Relations 
between Turkey and Syria have also been tense in the past as Syria provided the PKK 
with a safe basis in Damascus during the 1990s. Moreover, both countries also had a 
conflict concerning water distribution of the Euphrates and Tigris river (Olson, 1997). 
The fact that Ankara had close relations with Israel also played a role in Turkey’s 
troubled relationship with Syria in the 1990s (ibid, p. 178). Kanat (2012) states that 
Turkey and Syria were at the brink of war in October 1998 after a PKK attack in 
Turkey (p. 238). After this escalation, Syria decided to expel the PKK from Damascus 
and shortly after in 1999 PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in Kenya (Kanat, 
2012). After the capture of Öcalan, Turkish-Syrian relations improved markedly 
during the first decade of the 21
st
 Century. 
Yet, since the Syrian Civil War commenced in 2011, the bilateral relationship 
between Ankara and Damascus deteriorated once again and relations are adversarial 
since then (Kanat, 2012, p. 246).  As the Syrian Civil War has only recently 
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commenced and as the outcome of the civil war is still uncertain, it would go beyond 
this essay to analyze the impact of the Civil War in-depth. 
 An additional foreign impact on Turkey would be that the country is trying to 
become a member of the European Union (EU) and by now it is an official candidate 
for EU accession. Turkey applied for EU accession, already in 1987. The country was 
granted candidate status in 1999 but only in 2005 official negotiations started for EU 
accession (European Commission, 2012). Officially, the protection of minorities and 
respect for human rights are key political criteria for accession to the European Union 
(European Commission, 2012). Sasse (2008), however, has criticized the need for 
minority accommodation when states want to join the European Union. She argues 
that in Estonia and Latvia, where approximately one-quarter of the total population is 
Russian-speaking, language laws are rather restrictive and a considerable proportion 
of the Russophone minority is officially a non-citizen and hence has less rights 
compared to Estonian and Latvian citizens (Sasse, 2008, p. 850 & p. 851).  
An additional problem for minorities next to the question whether states abide 
by the EU right for minority protection, is that no EU requirements exist that 
minorities should influence foreign policy. Though one would expect that the EU 
could pressure Ankara so that the Turkish government is more respectful for its 
Kurdish minority and that measures are taken to increase the representation of Kurds 
in Turkish society. Sasse (2008) has come up though with a counter-argument against 
EU conditionality in the cases of Estonia and Latvia. The question then remains 
whether EU pressure leads to an increased accommodation of the Kurds in Turkey 
and whether in the long run the Kurdish voice would be increasingly heard by the 
Turkish government. 
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Israel, of course, is no official candidate for joining the European Union and has also 
never applied for EU accession. Israel and the EU uphold positive economic relations, 
but when it comes to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, the European 
Union has often condemned Israel (Mueller, 2013, p. 25). Hence, on the political 
level, bilateral relations are more constrained. Since Israel has a problematic relation 
with the Palestinians and since political decisions in the EU need to be taken by 
unanimity, it is unlikely that all 27 member states have the same approach vis-à-vis 
Israel and that political relations between the EU and Israel can progress. Or as 
Mueller (2013) has proclaimed, where Germany and The Netherlands have often been 
supportive of Israel in the past, France and Italy had a closer affiliation with 
Palestinian demands. 
Difficulties are also apparent between the EU and Turkey in Turkey’s 
accession process (European Commission, 2013). Yet the main point here is that 
Turkey is an official candidate member for accession to the EU and Israel is not. What 
follows is that every Progress Report of the European Commission examines the 
political criteria for Turkey’s accession, of which minority treatment is a factor, 
whereas such an EU report does not exist concerning Israel.  
 When continuing about membership of organizations, there is an additional 
difference between Turkey and Israel in that Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Israel is not. NATO is the main inter-governmental 
security organization in the world. More importantly, Turkey is a member of the 
Council of Europe and already ratified its human rights treaties during the 1980s, 
whereas Israel is not a member of the Council of Europe. Kurban (2013) argues that 
the European Court of Human Rights, a division of the Council of Europe, has played 
a key role in the past as to the Kurdish Question. 
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To sum up this part, the main foreign difference between the Arab and Kurdish 
minority is that the Kurds cannot count on the support of a Kurdish state abroad, 
whereas such a potential foreign support could be present for the Arabs in Israel. With 
regard to the recognition of Turkey and Israel, Israel is not recognized by three of its 
neighbors, whereas Turkey is recognized by all surrounding states. Furthermore, 
Israel has fought conflicts with neighboring states and organizations in the past and in 
the 21
st
 Century, whereas Turkey did not play a key role in a large inter-state conflict 
over the last decade. In addition, where Israel never had official relations with Syria, 
Turkey has often had an adverse relationship with the country, even when relations 
improved after the PKK was expelled from Damascus. Finally, Turkey is a member of 
NATO, the European Union and the, whereas Israel is not. This paper shall look into 
the role of the EU and the Council of Europe, when it comes to Turkey’s treatment of 
the Kurds. The next step though is to look into the influence of diaspora groups in 
general and then the domestic differences between Turkey and Israel are examined. 
 
Diaspora Influence: 
Diaspora living in a host country can influence that country’s foreign policy toward 
their country of origin (Ögelman, Money & Martin, 2002, p. 146). One critical factor 
that determines whether immigrant groups influence foreign policy-making is the 
group’s cohesion (Ögelman, Money & Martin, 2002, p. 146). Ögelman et al. (2002) 
argue that the cohesive right-wing Cuban diaspora in Florida was able to influence US 
foreign policy vis-à-vis Cuba, as the group was close-knit. The Turks in Germany, on 
the other hand, have diverging interests and as a result, they have great difficulties in 
influencing German foreign policy towards Turkey (Ögelman, Money & Martin, 
2002, p. 156). There is a divide amongst Turkish immigrants between anti- and pro-
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Kemalist believers. Some immigrants oppose Turkey’s secular character whereas 
others try to support it (p. 149).  
There is an additional fragmentation amongst the immigrants between pro-
Kurdish organizations and Turkish nationalist organizations (Ögelman, Money & 
Martin, 2002, p. 149 & p. 150). Ultranationalist movements try to influence German 
foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey and hope that Germany will follow a favorable foreign 
policy towards Ankara. According to Ögelman et al. (2002), nationalistic political 
parties in Turkey, such as the National Movement Party (MHP), support Turkish 
nationalist movements in Germany and try to counter organizations that go against the 
Turkish state. 
One of the main organizations, opposing nationalistic organizations in 
Germany, is the Federation of Kurdish Workers Associations. Already in 1995, there 
were 500.000 self-proclaimed Kurds living in Germany (Ögelman, Money & Martin, 
2002) and they have organized themselves into several pro-Kurdish organizations in 
Germany, with the Federation of Kurdish Workers Associations being one of the 
primary organizations. The aim of this organization is that the Kurds in Turkey shall 
be granted cultural autonomy and the right to self-determination (Ögelman, Money & 
Martin, 2002, p. 149). The Federation of Kurdish Workers Associations tries to 
pursue these goals through peaceful means.  
Yet there are also Kurdish organization in Germany and Europe that are 
related to the PKK and have used violence as a tactic to influence foreign policy 
(Ögelman, Money & Martin, 2002, p. 150). Yet these more extreme organizations 
mainly try to influence their host country’s foreign policy (ibid, p. 150). So far, the 
influence of minority diaspora on the foreign policy-making of their country of origin 
has been understudied. To give an example: The influence of Kurds living in 
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Germany on Turkish foreign policy is still unknown and needs to be investigated 
further. An important question to rise though is: why should Kurdish diaspora have an 
influence on Turkish foreign policy-making? This question needs to be investigated in 
more detail in future research, as it would go beyond the scope of this paper. The aim 
of mentioning diaspora influence here is simply to show that diaspora have influence 
their host country’s foreign policy decision-making, but so far little is known of 
diaspora influencing the foreign policy of their country of origin.  
When it comes to Kurdish diaspora trying to influence Turkey’s domestic 
politics, Kurban (2013) claims that in the past the Kurdish diaspora has played a role 
in bringing cases to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg and that as a 
result multiple cases were held against Turkey’s treatment of Kurdish civilians. All 
Council of Europe members are also members of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which explains why Kurds and Kurdish diaspora can bring cases to the court. 
Israeli Arab diaspora would not be able to start a case at the European Court of 
Human Rights as Israel is not a member of the organization. Hence it can be argued 
that since Turkey seeks EU membership and since Turkey is a member of the Council 
of Europe, it is easier for Kurdish diaspora to expose its cause internationally, whereas 
it is more difficult for Israeli Arabs. 
 
Domestic Differences: 
There are several key differences between Israel and Turkey that are analyzed in-
depth here, namely a difference in the countries’ history, the electoral system and the 
treatment of minority parties by the national Constitutional Court. In the latter cases, 
there are more opportunities for Arabs to be represented compared to Kurds. 
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An essential distinction between the Turkish and Israeli state is that both countries 
have had an entirely different history. Where the Turkish predecessor, the Ottoman 
Empire controlled a significant part of the Middle East from the 16
th
 Century until the 
end of the First World War, the Israeli state was only created in 1948 as a distinct 
Jewish state. Moreover, there was a belief at first in Israel that the Arab minority that 
remained in northern Israel, would also flee the state, hence no serious effort was 
made in incorporating the minority into society. In contrast, Turkey was established in 
1923 as a secular state but also here the state was unwilling to recognize the Kurdish 
minority and instead attempted to assimilate all minorities. Since Turkey was 
established as a secular state and Israel was instead created as a Jewish safe haven, it 
is essential to keep this into account when investigating the influence of both 
minorities on politics and foreign policy-making in particular. 
In relation to the electoral systems, there is an electoral threshold in Israel of 
2%, whereas this threshold is much higher in Turkey, namely 10%. Hence, it should 
be easier for Israeli Arab parties compared to Kurdish parties to be represented in 
parliament. In Turkey, no Kurdish party has managed to break the 10% threshold 
during General Elections in the 21
st
 Century. As a result, the minority is 
underrepresented in Parliament. In Israel, Arab political parties have always been 
represented in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, in the 21
st
 Century. Together the 
three main parties, National Democracy Assembly (Balad), United Arab List and the 
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash), have gained approximately 10% 
of the 120 seats in the Knesset. 
 Since the 1995 General Elections in Turkey the main Kurdish political party, 
the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), or its successors, the Democratic People’s 
Party (DEHAP), the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and the current Peace and 
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Democracy Party (BDP), were not able to surmount the 10% threshold. Due to this 
high threshold, the number of political parties in the Grand National Assembly is 
often limited. During the 2002 General Elections only two parties managed to gain 
more votes than required and managed to obtain a seat in the Assembly (Toros, 2011). 
Yet the Kurdish parties have also managed to grasp a few seats in the Grand National 
Assembly. Even though Turkey has a proportional representation system, independent 
candidates can become a member of the 550-seat parliament (Önis, 2009, p. 25). As 
there are 81 electoral areas, an independent candidate can run in an electoral area and 
if he or she gains most votes in such an area, the independent candidate will become a 
member of the Grand National Assembly (Toros, 2011, p. 1252). Of course the 10% 
threshold does not apply for independent candidates (ibid, p. 1252). 
 During the General Elections of 2007 and 2011 independent candidates 
managed to obtain 26 and 35 seats in the Assembly. Out of the 26 Independents in 
2007, 22 were affiliated with the pro-Kurdish DTP. In 2011, all elected Independents 
were followers of the successor of the DTP, namely the BDP.  Hence, the main pro-
Kurdish party managed to increase their share in Parliament from 22 to 35 members. 
The rise in seats is even larger compared to the 2002 General Elections, as only 9 
independent politicians were elected into the Grand National Assembly in that year. 
 There is, however, another difficulty for some pro-Kurdish parties. HADEP 
and DTP were forbidden by the Turkish Constitutional Court (Ekmekci, 2011, p. 1610 
& 1615). HADEP was forbidden in March 2003 on the conviction that the party 
supported the PKK and that as a result it put the unity and the territorial integrity of 
the country at stake (Moghadam, 2007, p. 86). The same happened with the DTP in 
December 2009. The party was disbanded on the grounds that it threatened the 
indivisible integrity of the Turkish state (Casier, 2010, p. 396). The Peace and 
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Democracy Party (BDP), which is the main pro-Kurdish political party at the moment, 
is the successor the DTP and has not yet been disbanded. 
 These problems for the main Kurdish parties with the Constitutional Court are 
not present in Israel. Balad and Hadash were officially banned by the Central 
Elections Committee from participating in the 2003 legislative elections, eventually 
the Israeli Supreme Court decided to overturn this measure and thus both parties were 
able to participate in the elections. 
 Next to the 10% threshold, there is an additional reason why HADEP, DEHAP 
and DTP did not manage to acquire a seat. Sarigil (2010) and Loizides (2010) claim 
that most Kurdish political parties can be considered left-wing and as a result, the 
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Taccip Erdogan has received a 
considerable amount of votes from more right-wing Kurdish voters. In concordance 
with this statement, Gunter and Yavuz (2007) argue that the AKP “is the only Turkish 
party that appeals to voters in Kurdish regions” (p. 296). What follows is that the 
principal Kurdish parties have quite some difficulty in obtaining a seat in the Grand 
National Assembly. 
 In Israel, the electoral threshold stands at only 2%, making it easier for Arab 
parties to gain a seat in the Knesset compared to the Kurds in Turkey. During the 
2009 Israeli legislative elections, three main Arab political parties managed to break 
the 2% threshold. The more Islamic oriented United Arab List-Ta’al party and the 
Arab socialist Hadash party both gained four seats in Parliament. The more secular 
party, Balad gained three seats. Next to these three Arab parties, Meretz is a fourth 
party that is fighting for minority rights, especially through affirmative action. This 
party also gained three seats. Hence, political parties that are concerned with the Arab 
minority gained 14 seats out of the 120 member Knesset. With a bit over 10% of the 
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number of seats, these parties have less support than expected, given that Arabs 
constitute more than 20% of the total population but the percentage is of course 
considerably higher than for Kurdish political parties in Turkey. 
 In other elections held in the 21
st
 Century, the Arab political parties and 
Meretz never gained more than seventeen seats in total. Hereby it should also be 
mentioned that Meretz also obtains her votes from Jewish constituents, as it is not an 
Arab political party per se. Comparing Kurdish and Arab representation in Parliament, 
it becomes clear that the electoral threshold does play a role when it comes to the 
representation of minorities. If the 10% threshold would also exist in Israel, not a 
single Israeli Arab party would be able to overcome the threshold. It should then come 
as no surprise that HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and BDP did not break the 10% Turkish 
threshold. Unsurprisingly, Ekmekci (2011) recommends the lowering of the 10% 
threshold, as this threshold “prevents fair representation of the Kurdish electorate in 
the Parliament” (p. 1614). 
 There is an additional difference between the Kurds and the Arabs, concerning 
the use of the mother tongue. In Israel, language facilities are provided for the Arab 
minority, whereas this is not the case for the Kurds. Arabic is the second official 
language in Israel after Hebrew. In Turkey, however, the use of Kurdish has for a 
long-time been prohibited and only recently has Turkey allowed the Kurds to speak 
their mother tongue (European Commission, 2013). Hence, there are differences 
between the treatment of the Kurdish minority and the Arab minority, but in both 
cases there are signs that the majority opposes the minority. Given that Moore (2002) 
argues that minorities can still influence foreign policy-making even when they are 
opposed by the majority, it is clear by the examination above that both the Kurdish 
and Arab minority have at times been opposed by the state. 
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Data: 
 
When investigating the role of pro-Arabic political parties, the website of the political 
parties are looked into. The aims and the achievements of the parties are studied. 
Unfortunately, there is no English-speaking session for the political parties, United 
Arab List and Balad, which represent the Arab minority in Israel specifically. Since 
this author does not understand neither Hebrew nor Arabic, the foreign policy goals of 
two other parties, Hadash and Meretz, are examined. It is important to remember that 
Meretz is not representing the Arabs specifically. Instead it calls itself a party, which 
is striving for peace and is concentrating on human rights in Israel (Meretz, 2013). 
Hadash is explicitly more concerned with the interest of Israeli-Arabs. 
 One of the main problems with examining the website of the political parties is 
that these websites are most likely not truly objective. On the websites, the political 
parties clearly state their viewpoints but there is a larger chance that they are 
overstating than understating their achievements. Thus when foreign policy 
achievements are mentioned on the website, it shall be tried to verify the achievement 
either via a secondary source or through the official website of the Knesset
3
 or the 
website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
4
. 
 An additional difficulty when analyzing the party websites is that not all of the 
information on the website is provided in English. For Meretz and Hadash there is 
more information provided in Hebrew and Arabic than in English. The main problem 
of analyzing the international party website of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
                                                 
3
 http://knesset.gov.il/main/eng/home.asp.  
4
 http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/. 
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Party
5
 (BDP) is that a majority of the links contain an error and as a result the reports 
and publications of the BDP cannot be accessed via the English-speaking website. 
Hence, this website is of little use for this thesis. As an alternative, the Turkish 
website of the BDP
6
 is looked into and the party program is translated to find out 
whether a remark is made on Turkish foreign policy and whether the Kurdish minority 
should have an influence on it. 
 An additional problem of analyzing the websites of the main Kurdish political 
parties is that all predecessors of the BDP have been prohibited and that the websites 
of these parties are inaccessible. As a result, only the BDP program can be 
investigated in the case of Turkey. The BDP exists since 2008; consequently the 
influence of pro-Kurdish parties cannot be examined for the entire 21
st
 Century.  As a 
result, when investigating the website of the main political parties, the focus shall be 
on the period from 2008 to 2013. 
 Next to investigating the websites of political parties, the most recent Progress 
Report of the European Commission is looked into and it is seen whether any mention 
of the Kurdish minority is made. A main problem with examining influences on 
foreign policy is that it is difficult to find proof of the influence or whether the timing 
is simply accidental. Everts and Isernia (2001) call this problem in relation to 
analyzing foreign policy issues, “their low level of visibility” (p. 3). Since the foreign 
policy domain is still highly secretive it is hard to assess which factors have played a 
role in foreign policy decision-making and which factors were less important or non-
existent. 
Claims that minorities play a role in foreign policy-making are double-
checked via the website of the Knesset and the Grand National Assembly. This is 
                                                 
5
 http://international.bdp.org.tr/.  
6
 http://www.bdp.org.tr/devam/17-bdp-program.aspx.  
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done in order to find out whether the political parties really are an influence in foreign 
policy-making. It could namely also be the case that these parties do not play a role 
and that other non-examined factors were the cause of the policy change. 
 
Examining Websites of the Relevant Political Parties in Israel: 
 
As stated above, the websites of Hadash and Meretz are investigated in this session. 
On the official website Hadash considers herself to be a broad left-wing party with 
socialist roots (Hadash, 2013). When it comes to foreign policy demands, Hadash is 
aiming for a “demilitarization of Israel and the whole Middle East and the abolition of 
nuclear and chemical weapons” (Hadash, 2013). At the moment, Israel and the Middle 
East have not demilitarized. Israel and Hamas have only recently fought a war, 
violence has increased in Iraq (Markey, 2013) and Syria finds herself entangled in a 
severe civil war (Carpenter, 2013). The latter demand concerning the abolition of 
nuclear and chemical weapons is also facing a grim prospect. Officially, Israel does 
not make any comments whether or not it has nuclear weapons. Yet it is believed that 
Israel possesses approximately 200 nuclear warheads (Makovsky, 2012). Moreover, 
Israel is not a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty (Pexton, 2012). 
In addition, concerning the Iranian nuclear program, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) proclaimed that Iran has not halted its uranium enrichment 
program. Finally, the American, British and French governments believe that 
chemical weapons are being used on a limited scale in Syria (Lynch & Warrick, 
2013). To shortly summarize, the foreign policy demands of Hadash, concerning the 
demilitarization of Israel and the Middle East and the abolition of chemical and 
nuclear weapons, do not seem to be met. 
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Other Hadash demands include achieving a Just Peace with the Palestinians and the 
support of a two-state solution, one state for Israel but also one for the Palestinians. 
The two-state solution has been proposed and agreed upon during the Oslo Accords of 
1993. One positive development has occurred in the 21
st
 Century, when former Prime-
Minister Sharon decided to dismantle all Jewish colonized villages in the Gaza Strip 
(David, 2012, p. 518). However, other signs have been less promising. 
During the 21
st
 Century more Jewish settlers have moved to the West Bank. It 
was estimated that in July 2012 there were more than 350.000 Jewish settlers living in 
the West Bank (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013). Moreover, with the wall crossing 
through West Bank territory, the two-state solution does not seem to be achievable in 
the short run. What is more, the Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinians has 
not seen any major development since the 2000 Camp David Accords and the 2003 
Road map to peace (Agbaria & Mustafa, 2010, p. 718). Since peace negotiations have 
been scarce since 2003, a two-state solution becomes increasingly difficult. One 
further difficulty for the two-state solution is the fact that the Palestinians themselves 
are divided.  Where Fatah is controlling the West Bank at the moment and recognizes 
Israel, Hamas is controlling the Gaza Strip and has until 2006 called for the 
destruction of the Israeli state (McGreal, 2006). Thus, the signs for a viable two-state 
solution and for a Just Peace are hardly visible. Over the last decade it should be clear 
that the demands of Hadash for a Just Peace and a two-state solution with the 
Palestinians have not been met. 
 In concordance with the above that there are no signs that the pro-Arabic 
political party Hadash has influenced Israel’s foreign policy, Hadash herself does not 
mention any foreign policy issues when mentioning achievements of the party. Most 
of these achievements were on environmental or sociological issues, such as 
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countering discrimination against women. Yet no foreign policy achievements are 
explicitly mentioned (Hadash, 2013). 
 Just like Hadash, Meretz is a left-wing party concerned with human rights in 
Israel (Meretz, 2013). On the official website, the party states that it is mainly 
concerned with social issues (Meretz, 2013). Moreover, just like Hadash, the party is 
fighting discrimination. Unlike Hadash, however, the demands of the Arab minority 
are not mentioned on the website of Meretz. When investigating the foreign policy 
demands of Meretz, the party is also striving for an Israeli-Palestinian peace but as 
was stated above the prospects for such a peace are grim. Conform to the claims made 
above Meretz realizes that the Peace Process with the Palestinians is stuck in a 
stalemate, that Jewish settlements are growing in the West-Bank and that the prospect 
of a two-state solution is declining. Moreover, the party claims that Israel’s both wars 
against Hamas have led to an unprecedented international isolation of Israel (Meretz, 
2013). 
In order to achieve a two-state solution, Meretz is calling for the revival of the 
Peace Process “between the Israeli and the Palestinian Governments” (Meretz, 2013). 
Moreover, Israel should immediately de facto recognize the Palestinian State. The 
third point of the plan is that a Regional Quartet should be installed to strengthen the 
Peace Process. Interestingly, Saudi-Arabia should be one of the four members of the 
Regional Quartet, even though the state does not recognize Israel. The final point of 
Meretz’s Four Point Plan calls for a solution to the broader Israeli-Arab conflict so 
that a Regional Peace can be created (Meretz, 2013). So far, only Egypt, Jordan and 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) have recognized Israel in the Middle 
Eastern region. 
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Some questions, however, remain with Meretz’s Four Point Plan. First of all, 
concerning the point of de facto recognizing the Palestinian State, how can Israel 
recognize a Palestinian State when the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are divided into 
two different entities with Fatah leading the West Bank and Hamas Gaza? With the 
Palestinian territories being controlled by two different organizations, Meretz does not 
explicitly proclaim whether Israel should recognize both governments or should strive 
for one Palestinian State.  
An additional question that remains is that Meretz does not specify with whom 
Israel should talk when the Peace Process is revived. On the one hand, Hamas won the 
last Legislative Elections held in January 2006, on the other hand, Israel has fought 
two wars with Hamas and the latter does not recognize the Israeli state. It would then 
seem easier for Israel to talk to Fatah, which is in control of the West Bank. The 
problem, however, with this option is that it would most likely not lead to a durable 
peace, since Fatah does not control the Gaza Strip and it is along the Gaza Strip where 
Israel’s last two conflicts have occurred (Rodman, 2013). 
 One essential difference that Meretz openly proclaims and Hadash remains 
silent about, is that Regional Peace is needed. As was mentioned before, Syria, 
Lebanon and Saudi-Arabia all do not recognize Israel. In order to create Regional 
Peace, it would be essential for Israel to talk to these countries and to establish official 
relations on the long-run. Due to the Syrian Civil War, a peace agreement between 
Syria and Israel is highly unlikely. It is first necessary that one organization controls 
all of Syria before equal talks between Syria and Israel can start. An immediate Peace 
Process between Lebanon and Israel will most likely also face major problems. One 
of the fears is that the conflict in Syria will also affect Lebanon (Shashank, 2012). An 
additional problem is that some political parties in Lebanon, such as Hezbollah, still 
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have a military wing. These armed forces need to be disarmed in order to create a 
sustainable peace between Israel and Lebanon. As Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese 
government at the moment, peace between Israel and Hezbollah is rather unlikely. 
 A majority of Israeli Arabs lives close to the Syrian and Lebanese border yet 
Meretz does not mention the Arab minority and whether it should have a voice in the 
Regional Peace Process. This is the more striking, since the Israeli-Arabs constitute a 
majority in Israel’s Northern District, which is the sole District bordering Lebanon 
and Syria. Hence, there are no signs that the Arab minority in Israel should play a role 
in the Four Point Plan of Meretz. Neither does Meretz state that the Arabs should have 
a say in the Regional Peace Plan with Syria, Lebanon and Saudi-Arabia.  
When it comes to accomplishments, Meretz does not mention any foreign 
policy achievements on her website. This is comparable to Hadash. Meretz, just like 
Hadash, primarily mentions achievements on social issues. After investigating the 
websites of Hadash and Meretz there are no signs that the parties have influenced 
foreign policy or that the Arab minority should play a role in the Peace Process with 
the neighboring states. 
There is an additional problem for the parties that represent the Arab minority. 
All three political parties, Hadash, United Arab List and Balad, have never made it 
into government. Meretz has been a coalition partner multiple times in the 1990s but 
the last time it joined a government was under Prime-Minister Ehud Barak’s Labor 
Party in 1999 and Meretz already left the government after a year in June 2000  
(Knesset, 2013). Since this study is merely investigating the 21
st
 Century and since 
Meretz has not been in government for more than a decade, it becomes clear that 
Meretz has played a very limited role in government during the 21
st
 Century. The 
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three main Israeli-Arab parties did not play any role at all in government, as they have 
never been a coalition member in government. 
 
Examining Websites of the Relevant Political Parties in Turkey: 
 
When investigating the program of the pro-Kurdish BDP, it is important to recall that 
this information was translated from Turkish to English, in order to compare the 
website with Hadash and Meretz. The BDP calls for a peaceful solution with the 
Kurds through strengthening democracy in Turkey. Moreover, the parry asks for 
collective rights and aims at the adherence of human rights in Turkey (BDP, 2013).  
This demand for collective rights is similar to the demand of the pro-Arabic political 
parties in Israel. Jamal (2011) namely argues that the Israeli-Arab parties also want 
collective rights for the Arab minority in Israel (Jamal, 2011, p. 40). 
Going back to the BDP, the pro-Kurdish party demands that Kurdish shall be 
used as a language in education. An additional demand of the BDP is that civil society 
is needed in Turkey as a whole and in the regions of Turkey in particular. Yet no 
statements are made on how Turkey should handle the Kurds living abroad. The BDP 
concentrates on collective rights for the Kurds living in Turkey and it argues that 
economic inequality should be reduced so that people living in Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia, where most Kurds live, can increase their income (BDP, 
2013). 
With regard to foreign policy-making, the BDP claims a framework is needed 
based on equality with other states and the adherence to human rights. Moreover, 
inter-state problems need to be solved peacefully through dialogue. In addition, the 
BDP demands that Turkey complies with international organizations, such as the 
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European Union, the United Nations and the Council of Europe so that democratic 
rights are strengthened. Hence, the BDP puts pressure on the Turkish government to 
comply with international law and that Turkey needs to be democratized. The BDP 
argues that international organizations, such as those mentioned above, can be an 
influence on Turkey’s compliance with international law. 
It should come as no surprise that the BDP wants the Turkish government to 
comply with international organizations, such as the EU and the Council of Europe, 
As both organizations and especially the European Court of Human Rights, which is 
the legal part of the Council of Europe have previously supported the Kurds in their 
legal struggle against the Turkish state (Kurban, 2013).  
Since the BDP wants Turkey to adhere to the democratic demands of the EU, 
it is logical that the BDP is a proponent of Turkey joining the EU (BDP, 2013). In 
order to accelerate Turkey’s accession to the European Union, the BDP calls for the 
unification of Cyprus in which the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots should live 
brotherly together in one state. As Turkey is the only state that recognizes the 
independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the BDP call for a 
unification of Cyprus is likely not to be heard from the governing AKP in Ankara. 
Even though the conflict in Cyprus ended in 1974, steps toward reconciliation 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are limited. Hence the BDP demand for one 
state in Cyprus based on equality is unlikely to occur soon.   
With regard to the Middle East, the BDP demands regional integration of the 
countries in the Middle East in order to democratize the region. In concordance with 
the statement above, relations between the Middle Eastern states need to be peaceful 
and wars need to be avoided at any time. In the region, the BDP is calling for the 
establishment of regional associations with Middle Eastern states. The party is calling 
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for increased cooperation amongst the Kurdistan Federal Region, which includes the 
Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
Concerning regional cooperation, Turkey and Iraq have intensified their 
economic relations over the last decade. In 2011, Iraq became the 2
nd
 largest export 
market for Turkey, with a total worth of more than $8 billion (Republic of Turkey 
Ministry of Economy, 2012). Tocci (2013) argues that most of Turkey’s trade is with 
Northern Iraq, where the Kurds are in government. Since 2007 Turkey has accepted 
the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq and has also established official ties with the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) (Tocci, 2013). Turkey has even become the 
main economic partner of the KRG. Hence, regional cooperation, what the BDP is 
demanding for, seems to be increasing. 
Tocci (2013), however, also argues that the BDP demand for group rights is 
not receiving support from the European Union. She argues that in the past when the 
Kurds were still calling for individual rights, EU support was considerably larger than 
now (p. 7). She even comes with a strong statement that the EU now has hardly any 
impact on Turkey’s political reforms. 
 
European Commission Progress Report: 
 
Now that the websites of the political parties are examined, the latest Progress Report 
of the European Commission is looked into and it is seen whether there is any 
mention of the Kurds influencing foreign policy. Yet little notice about the Kurdish 
minority is made in the latest Progress Report of the European Union. Some 
statements are made concerning the use of the Kurdish language in prison. The 
Commission reports that restrictions exist on the use of the Kurdish language in 
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prison. Moreover, there are limitations to the freedom of expression for Kurdish 
writers and journalists (European Commission, 2012). With regard to the terrorist 
attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the European Commission strongly 
denounces these attacks and once again stresses that the PKK is listed as a terrorist 
organization in the EU. Overall, no mention is made concerning the role of the Kurds 
in Turkish foreign policy. Regarding the progress on the Kurdish question, the report 
states that no improvement has been achieved (European Commission, 2012, p. 34). 
 
Conclusion and Implications: 
  
The aim of this essay was to find out to what extent Kurds and Arabs influence 
Turkish and Israeli foreign policy. There was particular interest in the pro-Kurdish 
BDP party and the Arab-Israeli oriented parties, Hadash and Meretz. One of the key 
demands of Hadash was the demilitarization of Israel and the Middle East. In 
addition, the party is in favor of a two-state solution with the Palestinians. During the 
last decade there are no signs that these demands are attainable in the short-term and 
hence, the influence of Hadash on Israeli foreign policy is negligible to non-existent.  
 Meretz admits that the Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinians is 
stuck and the party calls for a Four Point Plan to break the current stalemate. The 
party, however, does not specify with which Palestinian party Israel should negotiate. 
This is problematic as Fatah is in power in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip. In addition, it has been argued that one of the aims of Meretz, the quest for a 
Regional Peace, seems unattainable at the moment due to the Syrian Civil War and 
Hezbollah being part of the government in Lebanon. More importantly, on the official 
English-speaking website of Meretz, the party does not mention that the Arab 
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minority in Israel should play a role in the Regional Peace Process. Thus it has been 
argued here that there are no signs of Hadash and Meretz influencing Israel’s foreign 
policy or that the parties want the Arab minority to play a role in Israel’s foreign 
affairs. 
 The pro-Kurdish BDP is less concrete in its foreign policy demands compared 
to Meretz and Hadash. The party is in favor though of the unification of Cyprus. Yet 
comparable to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, steps towards reconciliation in 
Cyprus have hardly been made during the 21
st
 Century. Hence, the BDP demand of 
Cyprus its unification does not seem to be attainable anytime soon. 
 Regarding the Middle East, the BDP is calling for increased cooperation 
among states based on democratic values. The main problem here of course is that 
most countries in the Middle East cannot be considered democratic at all. 
Nevertheless, economic cooperation is increasing. Turkey’s trade with the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq has increased considerably since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Turkey even recognizes KRG autonomy in Northern 
Iraq. Hence regional cooperation, what the BDP is demanding, seems to be 
increasing. Yet no signs could be found that the BDP played a role in Turkey’s 
decision to increase her ties with the KRG. Thus, all in all, no proof could be found of 
the BDP influencing Turkey’s foreign policy. 
 In this paper it was due to scarcity of time not possible to investigate in-depth 
Kurdish and Arab diaspora influence as an Independent Variable on Turkish and 
Israeli foreign policy. The more general question is maybe even more important to 
analyze: why should diaspora influence foreign policy-making of their country of 
origin? This latter question needs to be tackled in future research and cases should be 
selected where diaspora influence is most likely. 
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 Additional research can also investigate in detail the role of the EU and the 
Council of Europe in supporting the Kurdish quest for minority accommodation. The 
Progress Report of the European Commission should then be analyzed on a yearly 
basis from 1998 onwards. Moreover, judgments at the European Court of Human 
Rights could have played a factor for the Turkish government, as the latter has 
increasingly accommodated the Kurdish minority. Future research could try and find 
out whether a correlation or even causation exists between judgments at the European 
Court of Human Rights and Kurdish minority accommodation.  
 
Implications: 
The first implication of this research is that Moore’s hypothesis cannot be defended. 
Moore (2002) namely argued that minorities can influence foreign policy even when 
they are opposed by the majority. As has been shown in this thesis, the Kurds and 
Arabs are disenfranchised compared to the national average, but according to Moore 
(2002) they could still play a role in foreign policy-making. As no signs were found of 
Kurdish and Arab influence, Moore’s hypothesis can no longer be sustained. 
Previous research has shown that minorities have influenced American foreign 
policy, but the two cases here were dissimilar compared to the United States. As has 
been stated before, minority issues do not yet seem de-securitized in Turkey and 
Israel, as they are in Western Europe or the United States. For future research it would 
be essential to investigate whether national minorities in Europe do influence foreign 
policy-making. An example could be the Catalans in Spain. Just like the Kurds they 
cannot count on the backing of a state, as no Catalan state exists until now. The 
Catalan case would not be as dissimilar to the US as the Kurdish case, as the quest for 
Catalan autonomy is non-violent. Moreover, the average income in Catalonia is higher 
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than the Spanish average, which was not the case for the Kurds in Turkey. A close 
examination of Catalan influence on Spanish foreign policy should make it easier to 
find out whether the findings in the United States, where minorities did play a role in 
foreign policy decision-making, can be generalized to more countries. 
A potential case, similar to the Israeli-Arabs, would be the Hungarian minority 
living in Romania. Also here frictions seem to occur between the majority and the 
minority. Two differences between Romania and Israel would be that the former is an 
EU member state, whereas Israel is no member. Hence, Romania should have 
accommodated its minorities before joining the Union. Yet, the EU member state does 
not grant the Hungarian minority official language status. In Israel though, Arabic is 
the second official language after Hebrew. Granting minorities with an official 
language status then is the second difference between Romania and Israel. 
Concluding, additional research is essential to find out whether national minorities in 
other countries, besides the selected cases for this study, can influence foreign policy-
making. In this paper there were no signs that Kurds and Arabs influenced foreign 
policy-making. 
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